Fire victims died trying to save cherished things

MELBOURNE

THEY died on Black Saturday trying to save things they loved. For Arthur Enver, it was his Harley-Davidson motorcycle. For Robert Pierce, and for Reg Evans and Angela Brunton, it was their homes. For Raye Carter, it was her goats.
The Bushfires Royal Commission yesterday conducted inquiries into the deaths of five residents of St Andrews killed by the Kilmore East fire that started 40 kilometres from where they lived. It hit St Andrews with such speed that those who died had no time to save themselves.
“One minute it was clear and the next there were flames everywhere. I don’t know where the fire came from,” Petra Boumans, Mr Enver’s partner, later told police.
They decided to flee but he wouldn’t get in the the car with her because he wanted to save his Harley.
As she left, he was hunting for the keys to his motorbike. She drove through heat so fierce that her car’s foglights exploded, and she had to drive over a fallen tree across the road. But she escaped.
Mr Enver, 56, was last seen alive by a passerby who reported he dropped his bike on the Kinglake-Heidelberg Road and ran. His body was found 400 metres from the bike by a CFA volunteer who saw him face down with his helmet alight.
A fire investigator concluded he might have been forced off the road into gravel by smoke or high winds, or perhaps his bike developed fuel failure.
Actor Reg Evans, 80, had elaborate plans to save the home he shared in Bald Spur Road with Angela Brunton, 48. He told a worried neighbour that afternoon, “It’s sweet, mate.” But he and his partner died, apparently trying to shelter under a dining table.
Fire investigator John Kelleher reported that their home’s A-frame construction made it more susceptible to wind damage and ember attack, and the loss of the roof contributed to their deaths. He said they had no back-up plan if sheltering inside the house failed.
Robert Pierce, 62, and his son Nicolas fought the fire at separate houses on the same property on Bald Spur Road. Nicolas Pierce told police: “I told Robert we had three or four hours to live or die . . . We shook hands and wished one another good luck.
“He was calm and appeared well-prepared . . . He almost appeared excited and relieved that the fire was finally coming after years of apprehension.”
Nicolas survived and saved one house, despite winds he estimated at up to 150 kilometres an hour and a fire front that lasted two hours. His father was later found dead near the entrance to a “safe room”.
Faye Carter, 68, was checking on her beloved dairy goats during an ember attack while her husband Alan took their dogs into the house.
Mr Carter told police: “I saw the fireball hit our front gate . . . and come straight up the drive like a car . . . Before I had time to react, the fireball hit our house, hit the cane setting at the front of the house, and then the roof exploded into a ball of flame.”
Mr Carter could not find his wife of 48 years and was badly burned. He drove down to his dam and jumped into the water to ease his pain before driving back to search for her again but was defeated by the heat.
He later spent five weeks in hospital having skin grafts to his arms and legs.
Mr Kelleher concluded that Mrs Carter died near the verandah. A large part of the roof had hit her nearby car, possibly also striking her and definitely destroying in one blow both her chances at survival: sheltering inside the house or escaping in the vehicle.

Police refused to enter ‘hellhole’

MELBOURNE

A POLICEMAN refused to evacuate a badly injured firefighter from Strathewen on Black Saturday, saying: “I’m not going into that f—ing hellhole and nor are any of my members.”
The Bushfires Royal Commission, inquiring into 11 Strathewen deaths yesterday, heard that firefighter Joe Shepherd died several days later. Mr Shepherd, 60, was found on a road near his van and his son Daniel, 32, was found dead inside the vehicle. Their path was blocked by a fallen tree.
The hellhole remark was quoted in a statement by CFA volunteer Michael Chapman that was read to the inquiry. Mr Chapman said CFA volunteers drove Mr Shepherd to a police checkpoint.
Telephone records showed Daniel Shepherd had tried to call 000 for help at 5.21pm but the call went unanswered.
The Shepherds had been trying to help a relative, Hendrik Vreulink, defend his house. They left the property when Mr Vreulink saw fire approaching, with a 40-metre wall of flame across his driveway. Mr Vreulink escaped, fleeing on foot through the bush and then being picked up by neighbour Denis Spooner.
Police arson chemist John Kelleher concluded the Shepherds might have been distracted by spot fires from recognising that a much larger fire was approaching. He said Daniel Shepherd seemed to be following advice to shelter in a car, but this was not appropriate when trees were alight nearby.
Mr Spooner claimed the local council had failed to remove roadside vegetation, which he said was responsible for the deaths of at least five people, including his wife and son, who were trapped by fallen trees. He said rural roads should be treated like firebreaks but instead “they are death traps . . . [Victoria] has got to revise these policies or buy us out and move us out and let the bush take over. It’s time someone took this government to task for all of this . . . People come before greenies. You can always plant another tree but you can’t plant another human being.”
Mr Spooner criticised forensic investigators for combing his property four times and concluding that there were no signs of his son’s presence, even though his son’s watch was in plain view. And he claimed that investigators had failed to find the body of one of his neighbours for more than four weeks: “They thought he was at another house. How do you think his family felt? His kids? They walked through that house when they were allowed back in and he was behind a door. What if they opened the door?”
The commission also heard that Michael Winton, 53, died of a heart attack that began at a police checkpoint where he was stopped from searching for his mother. Irma Winton, 77, died after repeatedly refusing family pleas to evacuate because she wanted to defend her home.
Five people, including three teenagers, died in or near a house in Pine Ridge Road whose roof had been lifted and flipped by the wind, then hurled into forest. Mr Kelleher’s report concluded: “The winds seem to have considerably exceeded design expectations.”

Fire service funding ‘flawed’

MELBOURNE

THE system for funding fire services is unfair because only people who take out home or contents insurance pay for it, the Bushfires Royal Commission heard yesterday.
It was also told that broadening the system would create a different kind of inequity because poorer people, such as age pensioners, would struggle to contribute.
“I’m concerned that [a property-based levy] might go into rates notices . . . and the largest user of debt collectors is local government, particularly rural and regional and outer-urban councils [chasing rate-payers],” said consumer lawyer Denis Nelthorpe, of the Bushfire Legal Help Unit.
The Metropolitan Fire Brigade and the Country Fire Authority are largely funded through a fire services levy.
This must be paid to the Victorian government by insurance companies. Companies then pass its cost on to customers in insurance premiums. This means those who do not insure — as was the case with 13 per cent of those burnt out on Black Saturday — make no contribution.
It is possible for fire services to bill uninsured residents for a callout, but this did not occur in relation to Black Saturday, said senior counsel assisting the commission Jack Rush, QC.
Joe Monforte, director of tax with the Victorian Treasury, said a property-based fire services tax would probably lower the cost of insurance. He said another option would be to remove the ability of services to waive costs for callouts, but such a policy would need to take into account the ability of people on low incomes to pay, and the “appropriateness in circumstances such as Black Saturday of billing displaced and distressed property owners”.
Mr Rush also raised the question of whether car owners should be made to help pay for fire services when he noted that road accidents comprise 15 per cent of MFB callouts and 10 per cent of CFA callouts.
He also questioned several witnesses over a lack of accountability by insurance companies over how they chose to pass the levy on to consumers. He quoted a 2003 report that found in the four years leading up to 2000-2001, insurance companies had collected $47 million more from consumers than they were required to pay to the government.
Mr Monforte said this might not be a significant amount in terms of the overall premiums collected.
“I don’t think there’s any evidence of individual companies gouging,” he said.
Dr Richard Tooth, of economic consultants LECG, told the commission that 23 per cent of households spent nothing on building or contents insurance.
Mr Rush said the fire services levy would generate revenue of $509 million in 2009-10.

Fire in the house!

In her new book, Karen Kissane tells how the Black Saturday fires changed forever not only the lives of those involved, but the way Australians see the bush.

IT WAS never the Sparkes’ plan to have Bron and the kids stay for a fire. A pregnant Bron had evacuated with Lola in 2006, and they were prepared to leg it this time, too. Now, Dominic was two and his big sister, Lola, 4. Bron had packed a few things, just in case. They were keeping an eye on the Kilmore fire via the CFA website but saw no reason to worry yet.
It had started more than 40 kilometres away and seemed to be running directly south, in a line that would bypass them, though Bron was uneasy at the speed it seemed to be travelling. Sometime in the late afternoon they walked halfway down their Kinglake block. It overlooks Strathewen and has views all the way to the city. They wanted to see what was happening with the Kilmore fire but they saw a puff of smoke much closer to home.
“Where is that?” Bron asked Shane. She thought it might be further away, in the little township of Doreen, but it was Strathewen.
Evacuation now seemed out of the question. The Kilmore fire was in the Mount Disappointment forest catchment to the west, which meant they wouldn’t feel safe taking the main road west out of Kinglake. The eastern road out, via St Andrews, was narrow and winding and would be a death trap if anyone should happen to crash and block it. They felt encircled by danger.
The official bushfire advice promoted by the CFA under the policy colloquially known as Stay or Go told them not to get into a car at the last minute, and the spot fire in Strathewen made this the last minute. It was not their choice, but they would have to stay and defend with their children.
Shane began jogging towards the house. Then the situation hit him and he began to run. Inside, he tried to call 000 and his adult son, whose girlfriend lives in Strathewen. He couldn’t get through to either number.
Bron ran back to the house with the children and rang her parents to let them know fire was in the area. “We’re at home. There’s a fire coming. We’ll be OK,” she reassured them. She didn’t tell them she loved them but that was the real reason for her call. She got herself into work overalls, heavy-duty navy cotton, and dressed the children in the protective clothing she had packed months ago in the family’s “fire box”: jeans, long-sleeved tops, leather boots. She had to squeeze Dom’s soft little feet into boots he had outgrown last winter. Protection was more important now.
Bron wasn’t panicked but she was worried. She remembered she had asked Shane to put up a spare piece of cement sheeting on the window of the spare bedroom, which faced west. They were renovating and he’d wanted to use it to fill a gap underneath one of the eaves. He’d been irritated by the way his wife and children had constantly seemed to get in the way of him getting that small job done. Now it was Bron who would be annoyed if it hadn’t been put up over that window. She thought, “If he hasn’t done it, I’ll bloody do it myself.”
He’d done it.
Bron began filling the bath but Shane told her to empty it so the run-off would fill the 44-gallon grey-water tank outside. The bath was half-empty when the electricity died, and he realised they would not be able to refill it. Shane cursed himself for a fool: “I’ve put the water we needed inside, outside. What have I done?” It was a bad moment but there was nothing to be done about it.
Shane knew these were their last few minutes of calm before the storm. Even the wind had dropped. Lola had picked up on the tension and was running around in anxious circles. “I don’t want it to be dark,” she cried out. They took the children to the door briefly and they all looked out at the orange glow in the sky. They could hear a distant rumble.
Shane had listened to the radio obsessively during the 2006 fires. One piece of advice had stuck with him: “Whatever you do, don’t let the fire frighten you. If you are caught in a fire, the noise will be sensational and terrifying and don’t let it get to you.” He warned the children, “It’s going to get louder and louder.”
Until now Bron had been running on formal advice, such as the dot points in safety brochures and the fire education she had received. As she looked at her small children and wondered how to prepare them for what she knew would be a horrifying ordeal, it was not dot points that came to her but a story. She remembered a novel by Bryce Courtenay, Four Fires, in which a young volunteer firefighter turns up at a farmhouse when a fire is approaching to find a frightened mother with her child. He gets them woollen blankets and explains in clear, simple terms what will happen.
Bron drew a breath.
“We’re going to play wet tents in the lounge room,” she told the children. “I’m going to put wet blankets over the top of you. It’s going to be very noisy, very dark and very scary, but you need to stay under the blankets and you’ll be OK. Just do as I say.”
By now Lola was frightened. She had fallen silent. Bron tried to tie wet towels over their heads but they ripped them off. They didn’t like a wet blanket over them either because it was too heavy. In desperation Bron tried Lola’s old cot blanket. It was two metres long and made of soft cream wool edged with satin ribbon. She put a rug under them on the floor and put the wet baby blanket over the three of them, singing nursery rhymes to help make it a game and to keep her voice calm. The distant thunder rolled closer to them. Shane stayed on lookout, pacing back and forth from one window to the other.
It went black; darker than night. There was a roar and bangs: loud, explosive, repetitive bangs, like a 44-gallon drum being dropped and rolled over bumps. Shane looked out the back door and saw trees at the bottom of the block catching fire. The flames were at least as tall as him, and he was nearly 180 centimetres. He figured the wall of 30-metre eucalypts at the bottom of the driveway would explode. Then small bushes close to the house caught alight. He thought, “We’re in the middle of a fire now. This is dead-set bushfire. It’s not going to miss us.” There was a sound as if a bomb had been dropped in the backyard, ker-boom! The house shook as if it had been hit, and the windows glowed orange with flames and glowing firebrands. They could hardly hear each other’s screams over the howl of the hurricane outside.
Shane dashed around the front and saw the garden and the veranda flickering with flames.
He knew he should check what was happening in the pitched roof of their Californian bungalow. He climbed through the manhole to find embers flying in through a slotted air vent and smouldering on the fibreglass insulation.
Again he cursed himself, this time for not having closed the vent.
The fire was still roaring and sparks showered through the gaps of the capping on the corrugated iron roof, as if a dozen angle-grinders were at work. Up in the roof, Shane gagged on thick black smoke heavy with chemical fumes. He got out and closed the manhole, telling himself, “I’ll put that fire out later.”
The frenetic Shane, pumped with adrenalin, darted into the kitchen and saw that flames had come in through gaps left by the renovation. A nylon parachute they had been using as a partition was alight. He tore it down and shouted, “Fire in the house! Fire in the house!”
One kitchen window pane fell out with a crack. As if the sudden change in air pressure was sucking glass out of its frames, every other window followed, the bangs of the initial cracking followed by smashes as the glass hit the floor. Bron had put the children in the centre of the lounge room to keep them as far from the windows as possible but the kitchen opened on to the lounge — they were effectively in the same room as the tongues of flame racing up curtains and licking at the walls trying to get a grip. Within seconds the kitchen was well and truly on fire.
The children couldn’t see the flames because their heads were covered by the blanket. Bron and Shane grabbed them and retreated to their last place of refuge: the spare bedroom with the cement sheeting across the window. As they slammed the door behind them Shane began to panic. He said, “This is not saving the house. There is no CFA going to help us. We’re screwed!”
Terror was like a medicine ball that they passed between them. While one was holding it, the other could function normally.
Now Shane had the medicine ball and Bron was cool and commanding. The room was well stocked with coats. “Get that one and put it at the bottom of the door,” she ordered. “We’ve got to seal it as much as possible.”
He hadn’t yet accepted that they were about to lose everything. He tried to open the door slightly to peek out and assess whether they would be able to escape through the front of the house but Bron, terrified that any crack would let in smoke or flames, screamed, “Don’t open the door!”
Bron lay on the floor with the children, a floor rug underneath them and the baby blanket over their heads. The blanket seemed to filter the air and they breathed more easily under it but Bron was anxious about Dom.
He was hysterical with fear, kicking and clawing and screaming. She feared he would break away from her into the darkness or that he would suffer from smoke inhalation because the screaming meant he was gulping toxic air. The smoke blinded him and the noise deafened him so he couldn’t see or hear his mother. He was lost in the dark, dreadful terror of the small child who had no words for this. She lay on top of him to keep him low. He screamed and writhed beneath her. Lola had moved beyond panic. She sat next to her mother, utterly still and silent. Shane was on all fours nearby.
He knew that the higher he was, the worse the air would be, and that he should stand only when he needed to. He took only shallow breaths and tried desperately to think of options: “How the hell are we going to get out of this?”
He realised this front was not going to pass in 10 minutes. It was still roaring as loudly as ever outside. This bushfire was more ferocious than anything he had been led to expect. It had been only five or six minutes from the time they realised they were in the middle of the fire to finding themselves cowering in the last safe room. A timber door lay between them and the flames devouring the lounge room and kitchen. A cement sheet on the window was the only thing protecting them from the firestorm outside.
On one level Shane felt fine: his body was working, he could stand up, he could breathe. He couldn’t think of what to do because the house was going up but the fire was still raging outside. He didn’t know it then, but he was waiting for a cue.
He needed something to prod him into action.
Bron could feel the floorboards under her legs getting hotter and knew the fire was under the house. Fire was now above them, below them and on all sides. “How can my children be a part of this?” she thought despairingly. “How can we be here? There’s nowhere to go. Beam us out of here!”
Lying there sheltering her children, she gave up. “We’re going to die of smoke inhalation,” she said flatly. For her, it was a simple statement of fact.
For Shane, this was his cue. He had no idea, as he would put it later, that “Bron was past the use-by date”. Her pointing out the brutal truth pierced his passivity, and his mind leapt into action. He realised three things in quick succession: that they had to get out of the house or they would die; that this was the point of no return; and that he needed to find out what they would be faced with outside.
In slow motion, heavily, reluctantly, he felt the window that was covered by the cement sheet: the glass was painfully
hot to the touch. He slowly opened it.
“This is death that we’re facing,” he
thought. “I wonder how much it’s going to hurt?” He said to Bron, “We’ll go outside.”
“Where?” she asked.
He envisaged what lay outside that window. A narrow concrete path led 10 metres to two large galvanised water tanks, one with 19,000 litres of water and the other with 11,300 litres. He decided they would open the valves and flood the path, which was 15 centimetres below the grass line. “We’ll lay down on the concrete path and cover ourselves with the blanket,” he said.
He grabbed the still-screaming Dom and gripped him between his legs as he punched out the cement sheet. Then, with his son in his arms, he vaulted through the window. He realised the half-metre space between the water tanks was a better option. The second he got there, he turned on the tap and soaked the child. Everything around them was alight except the water tanks.
He turned and was aghast to see there was no one behind him. He pushed Dom into mud and ran to the window, yelling, “Where the f— are you?”
“I don’t have Lola!” Bron shouted from inside the house. Even though the window was open, the smoke still left it impenetrably dark in there. She couldn’t touch or see her daughter, and Bron wasn’t going anywhere until she had Lola. She felt around and finally reached the frozen girl. Bron had trouble putting the blanket over her daughter’s head because she was trying to hold Lola with one hand and wrestle with the blanket with her other.
While she was doing that she took in a choking lungful of smoke. Coughing and spluttering, she realised, “If that happens again, I’ll pass out.” She remembered the safety instructions on aeroplanes that warn parents to fix their own oxygen masks first so they can save their children. It was hard, knowing that Lola would be taking in the toxins, but Bron put the blanket over her own head and got to the window with her daughter. A little hand reached out to Shane.
The four of them sheltered between the two tanks in a space just large enough for Bron to crouch with her children held tight against her, still under the baby blanket. On one side of the tanks the house was completely ablaze. On the other side of the tanks, two metres from where they were huddled, two blackwood trees were on fire. A ute on the nearby road had gone up and embers whizzed through the air. Shane stood with his back to the radiant heat of the house and used a hose to pour water over himself and his wife and children.
Tiny coals burned through his overalls and left him with cigarette-like burns on his backside. Bron took water into her mouth and put it into Dom’s mouth like a mother bird with a fragile chick. At one point Shane looked back at their home and said, “Kids, say goodbye to the house.”
They obediently peeked out from under the baby blanket. The roof was on and the frame was standing, so it was still recognisable as the shape of a house but the walls and the interiors had gone. The children took in the ball of flame. “Goodbye,” they said.
They had been there for nearly an hour when Shane saw a patch of blue sky. It reminded him of the moments of heavenly radiance in old Charlton Heston movies. He felt a burst of relief. “Shit, we’ve made it! Unless we do something really stupid or something terrible happens, we’ve made it, we’re out of this.” Shane looked over at the now incinerated ute that had been abandoned on the road and saw his own red van nearby with parking lights on and the keys in the ignition, just as he had left it in case a quick getaway was needed. He went over to it and made another find: his video camera was undamaged on the seat. He talked all the way back to his family as he filmed:
“Well, folks, here we are, I can’t believe what’s happened. Believe it or not, the goddamn Volkswagen’s made it, the Volkswagen’s made it. Here’s our front door . . . here’s our supply shed . . . here’s the only thing that matters . . . We survived!”
He swings the lens around to his wife and children crouching between the big metal tanks. The film shows Bron beaming with relief under the blanket, now grey with smoke and flecked with embers. On her lap is Lola, her face hidden by sodden strands of hair. Way back under the blanket, barely visible, is Dom. His baby-big head hangs forward with shock and exhaustion like a flower that is too heavy for its stalk. The blanket drapes over the three of them like a veil. It is a Black Saturday Madonna and children, covered with ash and framed by corrugated iron.
This is an edited extract from Worst of Days, Inside the Black Saturday Firestorm, by Karen Kissane (Hachette), $35

Bushfire blame laid with CFA, Brumby

ROYAL COMMISSION
Agencies told to get tougher on warnings, emphasise ‘go — or risk death’. Black Saturday marked as a failure
FIRE chief Russell Rees and the CFA failed to protect Victorians from the Black Saturday bushfires and should be forced to take greater responsibility to avoid a repeat disaster, the Bushfires Royal Commission has said.
In its interim report, the commission said the Victorian Government should revamp its controversial Stay or Go policy, with the CFA required to tell home owners whether or not their house was defendable.
It said the CFA’s chief officer Rees did not become involved in hands-on management on Black Saturday “even when the disastrous consequences of the fires began to emerge”.
The report said Mr Rees did not check warnings about the Kilmore fire that killed 121, did not speak to controllers at the two centres managing that fire, and did not know of fire behaviour experts or their predictions for the Kilmore blaze.
The commission said all this meant it was “difficult to understand” how the CFA lived up to its responsibility to give local communities information to ensure their safety.
The CFA should have accepted that issuing warnings was part of its job on Black Saturday, even though this was not spelled out in legislation, the report said.
It recommended that the law be changed to make it clear that warnings and advice to relocate were the responsibility of the agency managing a fire.
The report stopped short of suggesting the Stay or Go policy be ditched, but said people should be warned that staying to defend carried many risks, including death. Its 51 recommendations include:
– The re-introduction of community refuges.
– Incident controllers to be given more responsibility for issuing warnings, even when they are not managing the fire concerned.
– Emergency call services including triple-zero be boosted on high-risk days.
The report exposed bungles at the highest level, with the State Emergency Response Plan (SERP) not defining who was responsible for warnings and recommending evacuations.
“In addition, the means by which warnings were issued and evacuations were made on 7 February bore little resemblance to the arrangements in the SERP,” the report said.
“Diffuse or unclear responsibility for warnings and relocation is at best unhelpful and at worst life-threatening.”
The report recommended that whichever agency was responsible for an individual fire — the CFA or the Department of Sustainability and Environment — it should also be responsible for warnings and advice to relocate.
It gave a detailed analysis of what went wrong with management of the Kilmore fire. The commission heard evidence that warnings were drafted but not issued, due to CFA protocol, or authorised but not aired, due to internal communications problems.
The commissioners — chairman Bernard Teague, Susan Pascoe and Ron McLeod — made several recommendations that flowed from this.
They called for all incident control centres to be properly staffed and equipped; for the most experienced controller available to be appointed, regardless of which agency was managing the fire; and for senior controllers to be authorised to issue warnings they believed necessary, even if the warnings related to a fire being managed from another centre.
The Stay or Go policy and bushfire brochures had failed to emphasise adequately the risks of staying and defending, the commission said.
“The risks should be spelt out more plainly, including the risk of death,” the report said. “People should also be encouraged to recognise that not all houses are defendable in all situations and contingencies need to be considered in case the plan to stay and defend fails.”
The CFA should have the authority to give specific advice about the defendability of individual properties and whether residents should leave.
“For those who plan to leave, there should be more explicit advice on triggers that should be used to determine when to do so,” the report said.
People also needed more options than stay or go, because the preferred option might not be possible or might fail. “The availability of local areas of refuge is an important and essential complement to the ‘Stay or Go’ policy.”
The commission welcomed the State Government’s announcement of “neighbourhood safer places” to provide informal shelter but also recommended the setting up of community refuges, which should be defended by the CFA during a fire.
It said the lack of refuges failed people who found themselves in danger when their plans failed, were overwhelmed by circumstances, changed their minds or had no plan.
“The lack of refuges in Victoria also fails to assist people in areas threatened by fire who are away from their homes, such as employees, visitors, tourists, travellers and campers.”
The report recommended that Victoria Police review its guidelines on roadblocks, which were inflexible, and upset people who were already under pressure.
The commission recommended that warnings be clearer, that commercial radio and television stations also be allowed to issue them, and that sirens be played before the broadcasting of serious warnings to alert listeners to pay attention. It said community warning sirens should be re-introduced in towns that wanted them, and it recommended increasing the capacity of the triple-zero service and the Victorian Bushfire Information Line — which failed to answer 80 per cent of calls on February 7 — to handle spikes in volume.
It also suggested that a single multi-agency “portal” for bushfires be designed to allow incident control centres to post information and warnings directly. The portal should upload information simultaneously to both CFA and DSE websites.
Premier John Brumby said action was under way on most of the 51 recommendations. The Government would respond to all by August 31.
“The single most important responsibility I have got between now and the rest of the year is to make our state as fire-safe and as fire-ready as possible,” he said. He said the report “is basically endorsing ‘Stay or Go’, but what they are saying is that there needs to be a much stronger focus on leaving early”.
Millions of dollars had already been allocated to new fire-safety initiatives, including an $11.5 million public education campaign on the importance of leaving early, $30 million to upgrade incident control centres, and $167 million to improve emergency services communication systems. On the question of who should take responsibility for system failures on Black Saturday, Mr Brumby said: “There were systems which worked well on the day and systems which didn’t . . . (but) we had more than 600 fires that day.”
Nationals leader Peter Ryan said the report was a damning “catalogue of tragic failures” and showed the Government had failed to fix problems they knew might lead to a tragedy.
“The unfortunate truth is that much of what has led to [the deaths of 173 people] was known to the Government and the agencies before these events transpired,” he said. “There are across many of [the report’s] pages findings that I think are very compelling in terms of a criticism of the Government, its lack of preparation in relation to the day’s events, the fact that for many years — particularly in relation to warnings — they knew or they should have known there were deficiencies there that needed to be accommodated.”
THE CFA SHOULD …
– ADVISE people in bushfire-prone areas the safest option is always to leave rather than stay and defend. Children, the elderly and infirm should not fight fires.
– GIVE chief officer Russell Rees legislated responsibility for issuing warnings to the public.
– ENSURE warnings focus on maximising potential to save lives, and include a level above extreme.
– ISSUE more explicit information about risks and give specific advice about the defendability of individual properties.
– DIRECT firefighting resources, as a priority, to refuges where people are sheltering.
– RECOMMEND residents ‘relocate’ rather than stay and defend.
GOVERNMENT SHOULD…
– IDENTIFY neighbourhood safe areas such as car parks, sporting grounds, amenities blocks and dam walls that could be used as community refuges.
– INVESTIGATE technical possibility of sending warning messages to mobile phones by the 2009-10 bushfire season
– DEVELOP guidelines for use of fire station sirens to alert communities to bushfire threats.
THE MEDIA
– END ABC’S exclusive role as emergency broadcaster and enlist commercial networks in disseminating bushfire warnings.First published in The Age.

Earth, wind and fire

THE Black Saturday fires created 120 km/h winds, snapping trees in half. They created their own weather, triggering storm clouds and lightning strikes that started more fires. They fuelled flames that leaped 100 metres into the air and fireballs that barrelled ahead of a front and landed with explosive force in farmers’ paddocks.
And they fed on their own fury and destructiveness. The fiercer they became, the more strength they drew from the heat, wind and energy they had spawned.
The science behind them has been explained by fire behaviour expert Kevin Tolhurst in evidence to the Bushfires Royal Commission and in a report he produced for the inquiry on the physical nature of the fires that day.
Dr Tolhurst is senior lecturer in fire ecology and management at Melbourne University. He says the Black Saturday fires were unique in three ways: the speed of ignition, the intensity of the flames and the way they spread in ”pulses”, with prolific spotting up to 35 kilometres ahead of a front.
The Black Saturday fires were similar to previous Victorian fires in that they were at their worst following the cool change late in the day. The drop in temperature brings relief to baking cities but the associated change in wind direction can mean horror in country areas.
Cool changes ”turn the flank (side) of a long and narrow, cigar-shaped fire, driven by strong northerly winds, into a fire front several kilometres wide”, Dr Tolhurst says. ”Typically, about 80 per cent of the total area burnt occurs after this wind change.”
When five firefighters died at Linton in 1998 it was because a cold front turned a seemingly benign fire with flames less than half a metre high into a blaze with flames 10 metres high, he says.
On Black Saturday much of the bush was dried out from more than a decade of drought and 11 days of temperatures over 30 degrees. This meant it was easier for embers to bring fuel, such as bark or leaves, to kindling temperature of about 300 degrees.
They did not have to smoulder for long periods to dry the fuel because the fuel was already desiccated. Dr Tolhurst says the speed with which embers ignited spot fires was unique to February 7.
Even mountain ash and rainforest areas, usually moist, had been dried out.
”Normally you wouldn’t have a chance of trying to ignite or burn those areas . . . (but they) are the areas where the greatest fuel accumulation occurs so when they do burn, they burn with great intensity.”
A fire burning fiercely interacts with fuel, air, its own spot fires and the energy it produces to create a self-sustaining system. The more it consumes, the more it can consume.
The fires that day also set a record for spotting distance, due to the prevailing winds and the winds and heat the fires created.
The Kilmore fire on Black Saturday developed a smoke plume about 5200 metres from the ground and a huge white pyrocumulus cloud 8500 metres off the ground.
The plume acts like someone sucking on a straw, Dr Tolhurst says. As air rises into the plume, more air is drawn into its base. This vacuuming effect pulls on the thousands of surrounding spot fires, encouraging the burning areas to come together and form a whole, and drives the direction of the fire front. The formation of the pyrocumulus cloud adds further heat to the smoke column and reinforces the updraft of air.
If the atmosphere is unstable, it is easier for a parcel of warm air to rise. Thunderstorms develop in unstable atmospheres because warm moist air rises readily and forms thunderclouds.
Late on Black Saturday, pyrocumulus clouds developed into a fire-induced thunderstorm that produced lightning strikes and small fires in Melbourne’s water catchment forests, including the Upper Yarra and Britannia Creek catchments.
Bushfires create their own winds when air is whipped into the convection column at ground level.
”In the 2003 fires in Canberra, we saw the fire tornado that was a result of that convective effect,” Dr Tolhurst says. ”In the fires here on February 7 we saw trees snapped off – down at the Bunyip Ridge fire, for example, where the winds would have had to have been in the vicinity of 120 km/h or more.”
Fire whirls, balls, flares and willy-willies of flame are moving air filled with combustible gases, ”and the quickest way for these to rise is to actually spin in the same way as a tornado or willy-willy would rise by spinning. When it has got combustible gases in it, we get a fire whirl.”
A lot of people on Black Saturday saw ”fair dinkum fire flares or fire balls”, he says.
”The fuels were so dry and the temperatures were so high, the rate at which the volatile gases were given off was much quicker than normal, if you like, and so the likelihood of getting black smoke and these parcels of unburnt volatiles moving through the air is much greater.”
Those parcels of gases need to mix with air to ignite and often travel long distances through the fire zone before igniting when they hit fresh air at the edge of it. ”You only need to go down to Southbank to see the gas flares in front of the casino there. It is the same phenomenon. We see it separated from the source, and it won’t last, but it is there.”
Many people have described the noise of the fires that day as being like the rumble of dozens of freight trains or the roar of hundreds of jet engines.
That noise is not heard until the front is upon you, says Dr Tolhurst. Video of Marysville just before the fire showed it still and quiet, with hardly a flutter of leaves in the trees, because prevailing winds and the winds of the bushfire cancelled each other out. ”Often as the fire is approaching things will go calm,” he says.
Many things make up the roar of the fire front: ”One is just the strong winds associated with the fire, with updraughts and so on, so that you get the thrashing of leaves and twigs and branches and other material. You don’t even need much wind. The fire actually bursts the cells of the plants . . . the crackling of the cells as they explode with the heat from the fire is quite deafening.”
The Black Saturday fires burnt out 300,000 hectares and produced flames that leaped 100 metres in the air and had temperatures of up to 1200 degrees . ”The energy of the fires was equivalent to more than 1500 atomic bombs the size of the one used at Hiroshima . . . but bushfires release their energy in a ‘storm’, not a ‘blast’,” he says.
”The total amount of heat released from the fires on Black Saturday would have been sufficient to provide the total energy needs for all Victorian domestic and industrial use for a year. This energy was released in just a few hours.”
Dr Tolhurst told the commission the fires that day showed up holes in scientific knowledge and, therefore, in the advice given to the community.
Video around one fire observation tower showed severe flames for an hour and strong radiant heat for five hours in total. Dr Tolhurst says this phenomenon of ”areas of fire” that burn for long periods has not been studied adequately and is not reflected in fire advice that tells people they can shelter briefly in houses while a fire front passes quickly over.
Areas of massive spot fires that can burn for hours, rather than a passing front, are not captured well in scientific models or in training, he says.
”If a fire is only travelling at a maximum of five or 12 km/h per hour, why do so many kangaroos get killed, because they can travel much quicker than five or 10 kilometres an hour? It’s because they basically get surrounded by fire; they get engulfed in an area of fire. So we need to actually change our conceptual framework and follow that up with research that fits that pattern.”
THE RED STORM THE THREE STAGES OF FIRE
1 Directly under the smoke plume and driven by a northerly wind: This is the fastest and most intense phase. The fire burns out relatively quickly but could still last for an hour. This kind of blaze destroyed Humevale and Strathewen.
2 To the left (or east) of the left-hand flank: This kind of fire will affect an area for a long period of time. The area could be struck by firebrands coming from high up in the air and travelling long distances. Running fires could go on for two hours or more but the process is more gradual, and its intermittent nature may leave people confused or disoriented. This kind of fire attacked Kinglake and Pheasant Creek.
3 After the wind change: The long flank (side) of the fire turns and becomes the front. There is a massive release of embers and spotting is prolific.
Areas that were previously in clear air will fill with smoke with little warning. Spotting may occur five kilometres ahead of a front that is now 20 kilometres long. The danger of getting caught, surrounded by fire, is very high. This happened in Marysville, Buxton and Flowerdale.
SOURCE: DR KEVIN TOLHURST, MELBOURNE UNIVERSITY
EFFECTS OF SMOKE INHALATION
A million microscopic particles can enter your body in a single breath. The tinier the particles, the greater the threat they pose. A human hair is 70 microns wide.
15 MICRONS AND LARGER Half of particulates inhaled lodge in the mouth, nose and throat.
Possible effects Dryness, irritation, inflammation, chronic runny nose, nasal and throat cancers.
5-15 MICRONS Particles are deposited in trachea, pharynx and air passages in lungs.
Possible effects Breathing difficulties, cough, aggravation of existing heart and lung disease, influenza, bronchitis, lesions and lung cancer.
5 MICRONS AND LESS Tiniest particles penetrate the alveoli where lungs perform gas exchange. Some are removed by cells called macrophages; many will remain permanently.
Possible effects Pneumonia, emphysema, reduced blood and oxygen flow, loss of macrophages and alveoli.
COUNTDOWN TO A CATASTROPHE
THE MURRINDINDI FIRE/ FEBRUARY 7 2009
2.57pm DSE spotter Colin Hind at Mt Despair tower sees start of fire at Murrindindi mill. Phones regional district officer at Broadford DSE.
3.06pm Operations manager and crews arrive about 3.30pm.
3.30pm Mt Gordon spotter Andy Willans tries to call Marysville CFA captain Glen Fiske to warn him town under threat. Cannot get through.
Calls local Pauline Harrow instead.
3.45pm Alert message issued that fire burning in Murrindindi area and moving S/E direction.
4.30pm Andy Willans reports spotting in Narbethong.
4.45pm First urgent threat message for Narbethong issued by DSE (crossposted on CFA website 10 minutes later.
4.47pmWarning announced on ABC.
5pm DSE air observer flies over blaze and says there is fire “all around Narbethong”.
5.27pm Urgent threat message issued for Marysville. “The communities of Narbethong, Marysville and Buxton can expect to come under direct attack from this fire. Healesville residents are advised to remain on high alert.”
5.34pm ABC broadcasts threat message for Marysville.
5.45pm – 6pm Map predicting fire would hit Marysville produced in the IECC.
6.20pm Spot fire in Marysville (before main fire).
6.30pm South-westerly wind change hits, Narbethong and Marysville spot fires merge.
7pm DSE office on fire (partially destroyed).
Fire contained by 6pm, March 5 2009
KILMORE EAST FIRE/FEBRUARY 7 2009
11.49am Kilmore East fire reported to CFA.
12.33pm Infrared “linescan” of fire area taken by aircraft.
12.40pm Awareness warning for Wandong and Clonbinane.
2.25pm Alert message for Wandong.
2.40pm Urgent threat message for Wandong.
3.05pm Urgent threat messsage for Hidden Valley 3.18pm First time a threat to Kinglake is mentioned on radio. “Kay” from Kinglake calls 774 ABC and reports smoke in the sky, believing it is from a fire at Kilmore. “If I didn’t know about those fires I’d say we’re about to be hit by a wall of flames.”
3.53pm Urgent threat messages issued for Whittlesea, Hidden Valley, Heathcote Junction and Upper Plenty.
3.30pm Fire spotting into Pheasant Creek and Strathewen.
4pm-5pm Spotting starts in St Andrews.
4.01pm 774 ABC broadcasts urgent threat message for Whittlesea and Hidden Valley.
4.10pm Kilmore ICC drafts an urgent threat message warning for Clonbinane, Mt Disappointment, Kinglake, Heathcote Junction, Upper Plenty, Humevale, Reedy Creek, Strath Creek.
4.24pm Seymour RECC asked to distribute the Kilmore message through its fax due to problems with communications.
4.24pm 774 ABC radio reports fire is south of Kinglake escarpment.
4.35pm Alex Caughey at Seymour RECC sends out the Kilmore urgent threat message to IECC and others (message inexplicably goes missing, never appears online).
4.35pm Urgent threat message issued by CFA for areas including Whittlesea, Humevale, Arthurs Creek, Nutfield, Eden Park and Doreen.
4.43pm CFA spokesman mentions Kinglake is under threat in an ABC radio interview. First official threat warning on ABC about Kinglake.
5.20pm Kilmore incident controller Stuart Kreltszheim asks for urgent threat message stating communities from Kinglake to Flowerdale will be directly affected to be issued (Kinglake West, Pheasant Creek, Wandong, Wallan, Humevale, Kinglake, Glenburn, Flowerdale). Strathewen never mentioned.
5.35pm Map predicting fire spread produced at IECC based on 12.33pm linescan. Predicts that by 9pm fire could hit Kinglake, Pheasant Creek, St Andrews and Smith Gully to Diamond Creek.
5.40pm Kinglake-Flowerdale urgent threat message sent.
5.50pm Kinglake-Flowerdale message “reviewed” 5.55pm Urgent threat message for Kinglake and Flowerdale appears on CFA website. First time Kinglake mentioned online.
6pm – 6.30pm Fire hits Kinglake 7.44pm CFA chief officer Russell Rees interviewed on 774 ABC radio.
Says fire is “putting enormous pressure on areas like Kinglake West and Kinglake”.First published in The Age.